Cookie-indstillinger
Tilpas præferencer

Vi bruger cookies til at hjælpe dig med at navigere effektivt og udføre visse funktioner. Du finder detaljerede oplysninger om alle cookies under hver samtykkekategori nedenfor. Cookies der er kategoriseret som "Nødvendige" er gemt i din browser, da de er essentielle for at aktivere webstedets grundlæggende funktioner. Vi bruger også tredjepartscookies, der hjælper os med at analysere, hvordan du bruger dette websted, gemme dine præferencer og levere indhold der er relevant for dig. Disse cookies vil kun blive gemt i din browser med dit forudgående samtykke. Du kan vælge at aktivere eller deaktivere nogle eller alle af disse cookies, men deaktivering af nogle af dem kan påvirke din browseroplevelse.

Altid aktiv

Nødvendige cookies er essentielle for at få hjemmesiden til at fungere. Denne kategori inkluderer kun cookies som sikrer basale funktioner og sikkerhedsforanstaltninger for denne hjemmeside. Disse cookies gemmer ingen personlige oplysninger.

Funktionelle cookies hjælper med at udføre specifikke funktioner såsom deling af indhold på sociale medier, indsamle feedback og andre tredjeparts funktioner.

Statistik cookies bruges til at forstå hvordan hjemmesidens besøgende interagerer med hjemmesiden. Disse cookie giver informationer om antallet af besøgende, trafikkilder mm.

Marketing cookies bruges til at give den besøgende relevant annoncering og marketing kampagner. Disse cookies tracker besøgende på hjemmesiden og indsamler informationer til at skabe skræddersyet annoncering.

Andre ukategoriserede cookies er ved at blive analyseret og er endnu ikke klassificeret i en kategori.

Report Summary: Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and State Sovereignty in Cyberspace

Published on

 

Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and State Sovereignty in Cyberspace
By Kevin Jon Heller

Despite the final report of the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Us eof Information and Communication Technologies (OEWG) affirming that international law applies to cyberspace, there remains great difference of opinion among states on how exactly international law applies to cyberspace and what operations international law prohibits. Much of the difference centers around the legality of ‘low-intensity’ cyber operations, the most common form of cyber operatives. Such operations involve the penetration of a computer system located on the territory of another state without the use of force or prohibited intervention. Because of their low costs and high utility, low-intensity cyber operations, including counterterrorism efforts and espionage, are increasingly common.

This report analyzes three competing positions on low-intensity cyber attacks, contrasting the varying degrees to which they consider low-intensity attacks as violations of the sovereignty of the territorial state:

  1. Sovereignty as a Principle: According to this position, low-intensity cyber operations are never wrongful because sovereignty is a principle of international law rather than a rule that can be violated. This position is held solely by the UK.
  2. Pure Sovereignty: This position says that low-intensity operations are always wrongful because sovereignty is a primary rule of international law. Any non-consensual penetration of a computer system located on the territory of another state is an unlawful violation of this rule. This position is strongly supported by France.
  3. Relative Sovereignty: Although sovereignty is a primary rule of international law, only low-
    intensity cyber operations that cause physical damage or harm the cyberinfrastructure of a
    territory are wrongful. This position is supported by states such as the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and since 2021, somewhat by the United States.

The report provides a comprehensive analysis of these three positions and the states that support them. It is largely dismissive of the ‘sovereignty as a principle’ position while providing a legal comparison of the two positions that consider sovereignty a rule. It concludes that ‘pure sovereignty’ has a much stronger legal foundation in general international law. It considers which position Denmark should take, considering that it is a small, technologically advanced country which would favor the ‘pure sovereignty’ position. The report concludes by providing considerations for Danish policymakers, recommending that Denmark issue a public statement concerning whatever position it adopts, in the interest of helping to shape international law.

Read more here.

Categories: Nyheder

×

Log ind


Glemt adgangskode?

Er du ikke medlem? Opret medlemskab her